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Abstract
A covert communications network is a connected, overlay, peer-to-peer network being used to support communications within a
group in which the survival of the group depends on (a) conﬁdentiality and anonymity for communications, (b) concealment of
participation in the network to both other members of the group and external eavesdroppers, and (c) resilience against disconnec-
tion. These requirements are much more stringent than for typical privacy and anonymity systems. In order to protect the network
from subversion of individual nodes, neighbors of failed nodes have to be isolated from the network as well. Thus, all failures
have to treated as neighborhood failures. Network membership is protected through topology management in order to limit each
participant’s knowledge of the network addresses (IP address, email address, etc.) of other participants. In this paper, we propose a
measure for determining the suitability of random topologies for use in a covert communication network, and we use this measure
to analyze the suitability of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Graphs for use in a covert communication network.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The anonymity and privacy provided by public anonymity networks, such as Tor, are being increasingly targeted
by government agencies1–4. Any anonymity network that has central servers for advertising entry and exit nodes will
continue to be particularly vulnerable. To prevent censorship by government agencies and surveillance of partici-
pants by third parties in general, anonymity networks must provide membership concealment as well: the identities
of members of the anonymity network are concealed both from third parties that are not members and from other
members. We call networks that provide anonymity and membership concealment covert communication networks
(CCNs). Such networks can be realized using peer-to-peer networks (P2P) employing mix-based anonymity protocols
as long as the network grows in a distributed manner. Such networks provide a high-level of membership-concealment
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by limiting the connections between nodes within the network to personal relationships that already exist outside the
network5. CCNs rely on the topology of the network to provide both membership-concealment and resilience against
disconnection6,7. In this paper, we provide a measure for analyzing random topologies for their usefulness in CCNs.
Given the membership-concealment restrictions in a CCN, whenever the failure or subversion of an individual
node is detected, its neighboring nodes must be considered as “tainted” and must be deleted from the CCN as well.
This failure mode is known as neighborhood failure and gives raise to quality criteria that are diﬀerent than traditional
single-node failures. (Fully-connected networks, for example, perform very poorly for neighborhood failures, because
the failure of any single node brings down all the nodes.)
We deﬁne in6,7 the subversion impedance as a measure to capture the eﬀect of neighborhood failures in a CCN.
We show that for small numbers of nodes, covert network graphs can be constructed that have optimal subversion
impedance. Unfortunately, no deterministic construction method is known that is either scalable or that does not
divulge large numbers of members in the network whenever a new node joins. It is therefore important to understand
the quality (in our case the subversion impedance) of typical random topologies that emerge from nodes joining in a
CCN.
Random topologies (in particular Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs) are important in the study of CCNs because of the
diﬃculties in managing the membership of the CCN: when a new node joins a CCN, the communication must be as
local and as sparse as possible in order to not unduly divulge information about newly joining or existing members of
the network. As it turns out, the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi construction produces the topology of a network where connections are
established uniformly at random with a probability independent from every other edge. In this paper, we assume that
this property can be used to create topologies that minimize the sharing of network addresses among CCN participants
thus limiting the capability of an adversary from gaming the join protocol in order to maximize their knowledge of
the network addresses of other participants in the network.
We are interested in the risk incurred by the average node when a node is subverted, uniformly, at random, as
well as the case when the attacker targets and subverts a node in order to maximize the damage. Thus, we specify
the expected subversion impedance as a measure of the risk incurred by a random node and the expected worst-case
subversion impedance as the risk incurred by a node in the worst case for all graphs G ∈ Gn.
2. Expected Subversion Impedance
Observing that the survival of a CCN depends on both the number of surviving nodes and on their connectivity,
we deﬁne in6,7 the subversion impedance of a covert communications network as the product of the ratio of surviving
nodes (the secrecy) and the ratio of the surviving connectivity (the resilience) of the surviving network with respect to
the network before the failure.
LetG be a covert communication graph, and let H(G, v) denote the survivor graph after the failure of node v and its
neighborhood. We further denote by κ(G) the connectivity of graph G. The subversion impedance of communication
graph G with respect to failure of node v is denoted as γ(G, v), where:
γ(G, v) =
|H(G, v)|
|G| ×
κ(H(G, v))
κ(G)
. (1)
and the worst-case subversion impedance as γ∗(G), where:
γ∗(G) = γ(G, v∗) = min
v∈V γ(G, v) . (2)
If any subverted node in G produces a disconnected graph, then γ∗(G) = 0. We refer to the worst-case survivor graph
as H∗(G) = H(G, v∗). Thus,
γ∗(G) =
|H∗(G)|
|G| ×
κ(H∗(G))
κ(G)
. (3)
Consider a random graph processes, G, in which a random graph evolves as the number of nodes, n, increases. We
refer to the set of possible random graphs on n nodes as a family of random graphs denoted by Gn.
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Deﬁnition 1. The expected subversion impedance, E[γ(G)], is the expected value of the subversion impedance,
〈γ(G)〉, for all graphs G ∈ Gn;
E[γ(G)] =
∑
G∈Gn
〈γ(G)〉Pr(G) , (4)
where Pr(G) is the probability G occurs within Gn.
By extension, we can deﬁne both the expected secrecy measure and the expected resilience measure.
Deﬁnition 2. The expected secrecy for all graphs G ∈ Gn is:
E[S (G, v)] =
∑
G∈Gn
〈S (G, v)〉Pr(G) = n − E[d(v)] − 1
n
,
where E[d(v)] is the expected degree of node v ∈ V within the network topology, G(V, E) ∈ Gn.
Deﬁnition 3. The expected resilience for all graphs G ∈ Gn is:
E[K(G, v)] =
∑
G∈Gn
〈K(G)〉Pr(G) = 1
n
∑
G∈Gn
∑
v∈V
κ(H(G, v))
κ(G)
Pr(G)
We would like to be able to easily estimate the expected subversion impedance on random graphs from Gn. Of
course, since higher connectivity implies larger neighborhoods, E[S (G, v)] and E[K(G, v)] are correlated. Thus,
we can expect Cov[S (G, v),K(G, v)]  0. Thus, in order to calculate the expected subversion impedance from the
expected secrecy and the expected resilience, we use the following equation:
E[γ(G)] = E[S (G, v)]E[K(G, v)] +Cov[S (G, v),K(G, v)]. (5)
In order to determine the expected secrecy, the expected degree is easily calculated for many types of random topolo-
gies. However, the expected resilience is much more diﬃcult to calculate. We can apply Jenson’s inequality8 on the
expected resilience measure to get a lower bound on the expected resilience. Let E[κ(G)] be the expected vertex con-
nectivity on a graph G ∈ Gn and let E[κ(H(G, v))] be the expected connectivity of a survivor graph H(G, v) ∈ H(Gn),
where H(Gn) is the set of survivor graphs generated from the removal of a random closed neighborhood from a graph
in Gn. Then
E[K(G, v)] = E
[
κ(H(G, v))
κ(G)
]
≥ E[κ(H(G, v))]
E[κ(G)]
. (6)
From here, we need to establish the closeness of this bound, look for ways to estimate the vertex connectivity, and
determine the covariance between E[S (G, v)] and E[K(G, v)]–all of which are dependent on the particular random
graph process used.
3. Expected Worst-Case subversion Impedance
Even in random topologies, we are still concerned about worst-case subversions. In assessing a randomized graph
process, the expected worst-case subversion impedance will measure the expected worst-case.
Deﬁnition 4. The expected worst-case subversion impedance, E[γ∗(G)], is the expected value of the worst-case sub-
version impedance, γ∗(G), for all graphs G ∈ Gn;
E[γ∗(G)] =
∑
G∈Gn
γ∗(G)Pr(G) , (7)
where Pr(G) is the probability of G being occurring within the family, Gn.
In the following, we analyze Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs in order to determine their suitability as CCN topologies
and develop a closed-form estimate for the expected subversion impedance for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the expected subversion impedance among
Gn,p with increasing n and p. (95% CI)
Fig. 2. Comparison of the expected secrecy among Gn,p with in-
creasing n and p. (95% CI)
4. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Graphs
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs, or Gn,p and Gn,M graphs, are random undirected graphs with n nodes9. In Gn,p
graphs, each edge exists with an independent probability p. On the other hand, in Gn,M graphs, M edges are selected,
uniformly at random, from the n(n − 1)/2 possible edges.
In both types of graphs, the edge degree is binomially distributed. Since the secrecy measure is a function of the
node degree, the secrecy measure is also binomial. Thus, for a graph G ∈ Gn,p and s ∈ [0, 1], the probability that
S (G, v) = s is described by:
Pr(S (G, v) = s) = Pr(d(v) = n − ψ − 1) =
(
n − 1
n − ψ − 1
)
pn−ψ−1(1 − p)ψ ,
where ψ = s(n − 1). This gives the probability distribution of secrecy values across a graph G ∈ Gn,p. Since this is
a discrete distribution, the value s must be chosen such that ψ ∈ N. Otherwise ψ can be rounded oﬀ to the nearest
integer.
Thus, we can calculate the expected secrecy from Eq.(5):
E[S (G, v)] =
n − E[d(v)] − 1
n
=
n − (n − 1)p − 1
n
. (8)
These types of graphs are not guaranteed to be connected for small values of p and n. We assume that G is
connected. In connected topologies that are either very sparse or dense, there is a high probability that the removal of
a closed neighborhood disconnects the network. In either case, γ∗(G) = 0.
4.1. Results for the Expected Subversion Impedance
Fig.1 shows the results of simulations to calculate the expected subversion impedance for the Gn,p graph process
as n increases from 10 to 100 (increments of 5) for p = 0.15, p = 0.25 and p = 0.35. These results were generated
by averaging over 100 simulations for each increment of n and p. The ﬁgure shows that the expected subversion
impedance is higher for the smallest value of p.
When generating random graphs in our simulations, we discarded any G ∈ Gn,p that was not connected. Of course,
for low values of p and n, the higher the probability that the generated graph was disconnected, and discarded. While
this may skew the results based on degree distribution and vertex connectivity, our measures are only meaningful
is the starting topologies are connected. As n increases, even for low p, the probability that the generated graph is
disconnected lowers, which results in a decreasing number of graphs being discarded, which in turn leads to less skew.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the expected resilience among Gn,p with
increasing n and p. (95% CI)
Fig. 4. Comparison of the expected resilience determined from the
average resilience of generated random graphs (solid plots) with
the lower bound generated by Eq.(9) (hollow plots).
4.2. Results for the Expected Secrecy
Fig.2 shows the results of simulations to calculate the expected secrecy for the same values of p and range of n as
above. The solid lines are the plots for Eq.(8) for each value of p with increasing n. In each case the simulation results
quickly settle to the closed-form results. Unsurprisingly, the lower the value of p, the higher the expected secrecy,
since the neighborhoods within the topology are smaller.
4.3. Results for the Expected Resilience
Fig.3 shows the results of simulations to calculate the expected resilience for the same values of p and range of n
as above. We see that the expected resilience, for p = 0.15, is initially the lowest value compared to the larger values
of p shown. However, when n ≥ 30, E[K(G, v)] becomes highest when p = 0.15 (the smallest value of p tested).
Of course, determining the expected secrecy is computationally expensive given that the vertex connectivity must
be calculated for the original topology, G, and every potential survivor graph, H(G, v). Thus, if we could determine a
closed-form equation for calculating the expected secrecy, we could evaluate E[K(G, v)] for arbitrarily large topolo-
gies. A step in this direction would be to use the result from Bolloba´s that, for a ﬁxed p, 0 < p < 1, for almost every
graph G ∈ Gn,p, κ(G) = δ(G)9. Now, we can modify Eq.(6) to become
E[K(G, v)] ≥ E[δ(H(G, v))]
E[δ(G)]
, (9)
where E[δ(G)] and E[δ(H(G, v))] are the expected minimum degree for graph G ∈ Gn,p and the survivor graph
H(G, v) ∈ H(Gn,p), respectively. In Fig.4, the solid plots represent the simulation results for E[K(G, v)], as in Fig.3.
The hollow plots represent the lower bound of Eq.(9). For the latter, E[δ(G)] and E[δ(H(G, v))] are determined by
averaging the minimum degree from the graphs generated in the simulations for each p and n. From the simulation
results, when n = 100, E[δ(H(G, v))]/E[δ(G)] was within 1% of E[K(G, v)] for all tested values of p. The lower
bound is very tight and seems to converge to E[K(G, v)] as n increases. Thus, Eq.(9) seems to provide a good estimate
for E[K(G, v)].
4.4. Towards a Closed Form for E[δ(G)]
Bolloba´s identiﬁes several results related to vertex connectivity in Gn,p and Gn,M graphs in9. However, none of
these results provided an approach for estimating the expected connectivity or the expected minimum vertex degree.
We can, however, apply a series of results from order statistics10, from which we can calculate the expected minimum
from a set of n samples from a binomial distribution. For example, it is known that, for G ∈ Gn,p,
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E[δ(G)] = μ1:n =
n−1∑
x=0
[1 − F(x; n, p)]n , (10)
where F(x; n, p) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the binomial distribution10. In this expression, the
term μ1:n is used to denote the expected smallest value in a sample of n elements.
Fig.5 shows the error between the calculated estimates from simulation, E[δ(G)]sim, and the expectation as calcu-
lated from Eq.(10). For n = 100, the calculated estimates have an error of just over 2%, but which quickly falls oﬀ.
For n ≥ 1000, all test values (p ∈ [0.15, 0.35]) have an error of less than 1%. In fact, with these results, we assume
that, as n increases,
|E[δ(G)]sim − μ1:n|
E[δ(G)]sim
→ 0 . (11)
Using Eq.(9) gives us a good estimate for E[δ(G)] for large n, but what about E[δ(H(G, v))]? We know the expected
number of nodes in H(G, v), but does Eq.(9) still give a good estimate for the connectivity of the survivor graph?
Theorem 1. Let G(V, E) ∈ Gn,p for n ≥ 1 and p ∈ [0, 1], and let H(G, v) ⊂ G be the survivor graph resulting from
G − N[v] for some vertex v ∈ V. Then, H(G, v) ∈ Gn′,p′ with
n′ = n − E[d(v)] − 1 , and p′ → p , (12)
as n→ ∞.
Proof of Theorem. The proof is omitted due to lack of space. It can be found in11.
Thus, given the expected number of nodes in the survivor graph and the value for p, we can calculate an estimate
for E[δ(H(G, v))] which improves as n grows. Now, we show how to use the estimates developed above to develop a
closed-form estimate for E[γ(G, v)].
4.5. Towards a Closed Form Estimate for E[γ(G, v)]
With the results above, we use Eq.(10) to estimate E[δ(H(G, v))]. With this estimate and the closed-form estimate
for E[δ(G)], we can calculate a closed-form lower bound using Eq.(9)
E[K(G, v)] ≥ E[δ(H(G, v))]
E[δ(G)]
=
μ1:n′
μ1:n
=
∑n′−1
x=0 [1 − F(x; n′, p)]n′∑n−1
x=0[1 − F(x; n, p)]n
,
where μ1:n′ denotes the expected minimum value of the connectivity over the n′ nodes in the survivor graph where
n′ = n − E[d(G)] − 1 = n − n × p − 1 (we use the ceiling function to preserve the lower bound). The simulations
seem to indicate that |E[K(G, v)] − (μ1:n′/μ1:n)| → 0 as n→ ∞.
Fig.6 plots the comparison of the values for E[K(G, v)] (hollow plots, which are the same as shown in Fig.3), with
the closed-form estimates calculated using Eq.(13) (solid plots). We see the lower bound hold for n ≥ 30, and as n
increases, we see a convergence between the two plots.
Referring back to Eq.(5), we have closed-form equations for E[S (G, v)] (Eq.(8)) and E[K(G, v)] (Eq.(13)). We now
examine the covariance between these two values. Fig.7 shows the expected covariance as calculated from simulations
generated as the average of 100 simulations for each value of p and range n with n incremented by 10 at each step.
First, the results show that the covariance is positive. Given this result and Eq.(13), we have
E[γ(G, v)] ≥ E[S (G, v)] × E[K(G, v)] . (13)
Second, the results show that the covariance seems to be independent of p as the plots for each p and each n
seem to be identical. Third, as n increases, the covariance decays at an exponential rate. For G ∈ Gn,p with n > 30,
Cov[E[S (G, v)], E[K(, v)]] < 0.01. Thus, as n increases, the expected secrecy and expected resilience seem to become
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Fig. 5. The error between the expected minimum degree derived
from simulations and μ1:n.
Fig. 6. Comparison of the expected resilience with the closed-form
estimates.
Fig. 7. Average covariance for graphs in Gn,p with 10 ≤ n ≤ 100
and p = 0.15, p = 0.25, and p = 0.35, respectively. (95% CI)
Fig. 8. Comparison of the expected subversion impedance derived
from simulations (95% CI) with the closed-form estimates.
more and more independent. Thus, assuming thatCov[E[S (G, v)], E[K(G, v)]]→ 0 and |E[K(G, v)]−(μ1:n′/μ1:n)| → 0
as n→ ∞, we have
E[γ(G, v)]→ E[S (G, v)] × E[K(G, v)] . (14)
Fig.8 displays the diﬀerence between the expected subversion impedance, E[γ(G, v)], averaged from simulations
and the closed-form estimate from Eq.(14). We see a quick convergence between these two values for topologies as
small as n = 30 (less than 10% error). At n = 100, we have only 1% error between the simulation results and the
closed-form estimate.
4.6. Results for the Expected Worst-Case Subversion Impedance
Whereas the estimate for E[δ(Gn,p)] derived above works well as a basis for estimating E[γ(Gn,p)], it will not
suﬃce for estimating the expected worst-case subversion impedance. An approach for a closed-form estimate for
E[γ∗(Gn,p)] could use an approach similar to that used above, but the focus would need to be on ﬁnding a good
estimate for E[δ(H(G, v∗))].
In Fig.9, the expected worst-case subversion impedance is shown as calculated based on simulations (the average
of 100 randomly generated, connected graphs from Gn,p with, as before, 10 ≤ n ≤ 100 and p = 0.15, p = 0.25, and
p = 0.35, respectively. We see that when n ≤ 60, E[γ∗(Gn,p)] is lowest when p = 0.15. However, as n continues to
increase, a low value for p proves to be best.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the expected worst-case subversion impedance among Gn,p with increasing n and p. (95% CI)
5. Conclusions
Our analysis was motivated by12 where Albert, Jeong, and Baraba´si compare the eﬀects of random and worst-case
attacks in Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs and scale-free random graphs as single nodes are removed. Likewise, we
examine the eﬀects of neighborhood failures on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs in both the random and worst case. We
deﬁned measures for assessing the suitability of a random topology for a CCN. With these measures, we analyzed
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Graphs and determined a closed-form estimate for the expected subversion impedance of Gn,p
graphs. Future work will involve analyzing the subversion impedance for the family of scale-free random graphs
using the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) construction. However, given the degree distribution for a BA constructed scale-free
topology, we anticipate the expected worst-case subversion impedance to be signiﬁcantly lower than that of Gn,p
graphs. The homogenous nature of Gn,p graphs should make them less vulnerable to catastrophic damage resulting
from neighborhood failures.
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